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Market Report
Yr 
Ago
4 Wks
Ago 4/16/10
Livestock and Products,
 Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
  35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
  Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb.. . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
  Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . . . .
Choice Boxed Beef, 
  600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
  Carcass, Negotiated. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Pigs, National Direct
  50 lbs, FOB.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass,   
     51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, Ch. & Pr., Heavy,
  Wooled, South Dakota, Direct. . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout,
  FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
$88.77
117.44
100.88
145.37
59.20
65.17
60.94
92.00
249.27
$     *
127.58
105.72
153.69
67.92
       *
73.66
       *
273.07
$99.96
128.29
115.78
166.77
80.10
 
       *
82.82
       *
288.98
Crops, 
 Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
  Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
  Omaha, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
  Omaha, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grain Sorghum, No. 2, Yellow
  Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
  Minneapolis, MN , bu. . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.92
3.67
10.28
5.50
1.86
3.77
3.58
9.46
5.63
2.24
3.96
3.53
9.79
5.61
2.15
Feed
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
  Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
  Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
  Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Premium
  Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture, 
  Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture, 
    Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
190.00
77.50
85.00
130.00
49.00
135.00
87.50
       *
95.00
34.00
135.00
92.50
       *
103.50
35.50
*No Market
Suppliers of water and energy are frequently
natural monopolies, with their pricing regulated by
governmental agencies. Pricing schemes are evaluated
by the efficiency of the resource allocation they lead to,
the capacity of the utilities to capture their costs and
the distributional effects of the policies, in particular,
impacts on the poor. One pricing approach has been
average cost pricing, which guarantees cost recovery
and allows utilities to provide their product at
relatively low prices. However, average cost pricing
leads to economically inefficient consumption levels,
when sources of water and energy are limited and
increasing the supply is costly. An alternative approach
is increasing block rates (hereafter, IBR or tiered
pricing), where individuals pay a low rate for an initial
consumption block and a higher rate as they increase
use beyond that block. An example of IBR is shown in
Figure 1 (on next page), which shows a rate structure
for residential water use. With the rates in Figure 1, a
household would be charged $0.46 and $0.71 per
hundred gallons for consumption below and above
21,000 gallons per month, respectively. 
Increasing block rates are frequently used by
regulated utilities in the United States and worldwide.
An Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) study of water rates in
developed countries shows frequent use of increasing
block rates (OECD, 1999). Concerns about conser-
vation have led to a widespread shift in pricing
patterns; while only four percent of public water
suppliers in the United States used IBR in 1982, over
30 percent did by 1997 (OECD, 1999). Over the same
period, the use of decreasing block rates fell from 60 to
34 percent of public water suppliers. Advocates of IBR
argue that it can improve equity by offering the poor a
subsidized rate on consumption. Others argue that
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tiered pricing will encourage over consumption if the
subsidized block is too large. For example, a study of
water utilities by the Asian Development Bank (1993)
found that the average size of the subsidized block is
almost 300 percent of basic needs. Thus, if IBR
pricing is not properly designed, it could lead to
consumption in excess of basic needs or economically
efficient levels. This might not be a concern if there is
a large volume of inexpensive water or energy that is
consistently available.
H o w e v e r ,  w h e n
considering the use of a
scarce resource such as
water this result needs
to be considered, as
inefficient economic
outcomes may lead to
n o n - s u s t a i n a b l e
consumption patterns.
In a recent research
paper, we examine the
question “when can
tiered pricing be used to
simultaneously improve
equity, achieve econo-
mic efficiency and
r e t a i n  r e v e n u e
neutrality?" We show
that  under  cer ta in
conditions, a regulated utility can achieve all of these
goals. However, the feasibility depends on the
underlying cost structure and the demand function for
water or energy. Utilities with a diverse set of
suppliers, and without extremely poor customers are
best able to achieve these joint goals. This result is
important, because it implies that those utilities with
various inputs (i.e., electricity providers that utilize
coal, natural gas and hydropower; or water providers
that have sources from multiple rivers and
groundwater aquifers) are better able to use tiered
pricing to improve equity than those that rely on a
single input source.
We demonstrate how shifts in parameters of the
benefit or supply functions affect the design of a
tiered pricing rate structure. To measure equity, we
used the Gini coefficient. The Gini coefficient
measures how far a distribution is from being equal,
and it is always between zero and one. It is frequently
used to measure income distribution. For example, a
Gini coefficient of zero for income means that income
is equally distributed among all people. A Gini
coefficient of one means that one person has all the
wealth while everyone else has nothing. Recent
numbers from the United Nations show that the Gini
coefficient of income in Mexico is 0.46, Turkey is
0.44, the United States is 0.41, Italy is 0.36 and
Sweden and Japan are 0.25. 
In our research we use the Gini coefficient to
measure improvements in equity, after a switch from
marginal cost pricing to increasing block rates. Using
a numerical simulation, we find that a switch from
marginal to average cost pricing can reduce the Gini
coefficient by 50 percent. The improvement in equity
achieved via a switch
from marginal cost
pricing to increasing
block rates is in the
range of 30-90 percent,
depending on the
number of suppliers of
water/energy and the
demand for  the
products. Larger im-
provements in equity
occur when there are
many low cost sources
of the product, or
when overall demand
is relatively high.
Increasing the rebate
associated with IBR
u n a m b i g u o u s l y
improves equity, but
the size of the rebate is
limited by the options that are revenue neutral for the
company. 
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Figure 1. Rates for Residential Water Use: Example of Increasing Block Rates
